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ARTICLES
Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place:
Rethinking Regulatory Review
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMANI
Policymakers need to reassess the role of cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) in regulatory review. Although it remains a valuable tool, a num-
ber of pressing current problems do not fit well into the CBA paradigm.
In particular, climate change, nuclear accident risks, and the preservation
of biodiversity can have very long-run impacts that may produce cata-
strophic and irreversible effects. This article seeks to put cost-benefit
analysis in its place by demonstrating both its strengths and its limita-
tions. The Obama Administration should rethink the use of CBA as a
way to evaluate regulatory policies and develop procedures to restrict its
use to policy areas where its underlying assumptions fit the nature of the
problem.
CBA is suitable for many conventional policy issues that have lim-
ited but significant effects on society in the short to medium run. The
best analogy is to the decisions made by large corporations when they
decide how to invest to maximize profits. In such cases, both public
agencies and firms seek to maximize net gains, holding conditions in the
rest of the world constant.2 However, that is not an appropriate analogy
for policies with a significant global impact.
Since 1981, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) in the White House has reviewed significant proposed and final
regulations for conformity with cost-benefit tests.3 Under a series of
executive orders, OIRA has performed this role through Republican and
1. Henry R. Luce Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), Yale University.
2. For a classic introduction to cost-benefit analysis, see E.J. MIsHAN, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (new & expanded ed. 1976); E.J. MISHAN & EuSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
(Routledge 5th ed. 2007) (1976). For a widely used text in policy schools that presents the basics,
see DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS (5th ed. 2011).
3. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 H§ 3(d)-(e), 3(f)(1), 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641, 645-46
(1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). Taken together, these sections of the
executive order require agencies to prepare cost-benefit analysis for all proposed and final rules
that will have "an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a
material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities." Id.
§ 3(f)(1). The executive order does not apply to independent agencies, such as the Federal Trade
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Democratic presidencies.4 These policy reviews are controversial: Some
claim that OIRA promotes the use of sound social-scientific reasoning;
others see it as a front for business interests and a triumph of cold and
heartless economic reasoning.'
President Barack Obama has continued the practice of regulatory
review under the executive order originally issued by President Bill
Clinton and kept in place by President George W. Bush. However, in
January 2009, the Administration expressed an interest in revising the
executive order. OIRA opened a comment period and received a broad
response from the policy community.' So far, nothing has happened.
The comments seem to have fallen into a black hole. OIRA has not
attempted a full-blown reconsideration of the executive order. It has
concentrated instead on increasing the transparency of government, and
especially, on the ease of access to regulatory information and data sets.
Otherwise, it is "business as usual"-with the staff reviewing proposed
and final rules with only an occasional flare-up over controversial
issues, such as whether or not to designate coal ash as a hazardous
waste.
Commission or the Federal Communications Commission, but many of them have also created
policy analysis offices to review regulations and other policies.
4. George W. Bush kept Clinton's Executive Order 12,866 in place, extending its reach to
guidance documents and making a few other changes. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191
(2007). Obama revoked the Bush modifications, thus returning OIRA to enforcing the original
Clinton order. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009). Precursors to
Ronald Reagan's Executive Order, see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C § 601 (2006), date from the Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, see Exec. Order No.
11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1974), and Jimmy Carter, see Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978),
reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006), administrations. See also THOMAS 0. McGARITY,
REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACY 18 (1991); Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 824-30 (2003); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARv.
ENvTL. L. REv. 433, 446-47 (2008). On OIRA under George W. Bush, see John D. Graham,
Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 456-83
(2008).
5. See Croley, supra note 4, at 831-33 (summarizing the arguments on both sides). Clinton's
executive order, which is still in place, responded to some of the criticisms by requiring the
transparent reporting of all meetings with outsiders and an opportunity for the regulatory agency
to be present when OIRA officials met with outsiders. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, §6(b)(4), 3
C.F.R. 647, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C § 601 (2006). It also added time limits to prevent
OIRA from simply bottling up disfavored rules. See id. § 6(b)(2). For further discussion on the
presidential role in regulatory review, see James R. Bowers, Looking at OMB's Regulatory
Review Through a Shared Powers Perspective, 23 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 331 (1993).
6. The comments are published on the OIRA website. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Public Comments on OMB Recommendations for a
New Executive Order on Regulatory Review, REGIo.Gov, http://www.reginfo.gov/publicljsp/
EO/fedRegReview/publicComments.jsp (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
7. To track current OIRA activities, see Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, WHrE
HOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg-default (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
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The failure to rethink the executive order is unfortunate-espe-
cially given the global trend to institutionalize something called impact
assessment (IA). IA is not quite the same thing as CBA, but it is
grounded in an identical commitment to promulgating policies that have
positive net benefits while at the same time improving public accounta-
bility and incorporating other values.' A bandwagon may be starting that
needs to be subject to critical scrutiny before it acquires the status of
conventional wisdom.'
With no change in the executive order, CBA will continue to be
enshrined as the ideal standard for regulation in the United States. Even
if the actual cost-benefit studies performed by U.S. government agencies
are highly variable in quality and often lack key components, the tech-
nique remains a benchmark for analysis.10
I seek to challenge the hegemony of CBA on two grounds. First,
cost-benefit analysis should be used to evaluate only a limited class of
regulatory policies, and even then it should be supplemented with value
choices not dictated by welfare economics. Second, CBA presents an
impoverished normative framework for policy choices that do not fall
into this first category. Policy ought to be made on other grounds even
though consideration of the costs and the benefits of a program is obvi-
ously a requirement for sound policymaking.
I do not wish to be misunderstood. I favor technocratic analysis that
measures both costs and benefits in the most accurate way possible and
8. On impact assessment in European Union member states, see ANDREA RENDA, IMPACT
ASSESSMENT IN THE EU (2006); Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, 59 CURRENT
LEGAL PRoBs. 447 (2006). For material on the European Union's impact-assessment initiative,
consult Impact Assessment-Key Documents, EuR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/governance/
impact/keydocs/keydocs en.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2010).
9. For arguments that cost-benefit analysis has already become and ought to continue to be a
routine tool for policymaking, see RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR
HEALTH (2008); CAsS R. SuNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION (2002); Graham, supra note 4, at 515-16. Sunstein is, of course, the current head of
OIRA. But see FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN,
RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003). An alternative is
"feasibility" analysis under which policy is pushing up to the point where widespread plant
shutdowns would occur at higher levels of stringency. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the
Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (2005); Amy Sinden et al., Cost-
Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48, 63-66 (2009)
(reviewing MATTHEw D. ADLER & EIc A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (2006)). In my view, this option has little to recommend it because of its failure to
balance except at the knife edge.
10. See Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Govenment Do
Benefit-Cost Analysis, I REv. ENvTL. EcON. & POL'Y 192 (2007).
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that uses these data to make intelligent policy choices." Problems arise,
however, when the search for a single "best" policy forces analysts to
make controversial assumptions simply to produce an answer that "max-
imizes" social welfare. The debate often conflates two related problems.
First, analysts must resolve a set of difficult conceptual issues even
where CBA is an appropriate technique on normative grounds. More
fundamentally, the second set of problems strikes at the heart of the
technique and make it an inappropriate metric for the analysis of some
policy issues.
First, difficult issues arise even if net-benefit maximization is a
plausible public goal. In the best case for cost-benefit analysis, the pro-
gram seeks to correct a failure in private markets, and the law's distribu-
tive consequences are not a major concern. Overall distributive effects
may be small or, if large, tilt in an egalitarian direction, as when a regu-
lation limits the monopoly power of large businesses. Here, the main
problems are measurement difficulties that are sometimes so fundamen-
tal that better analysis or consultation with experts cannot solve them. I
am thinking mainly of debates over the proper discount rate for future
benefits and costs; efforts to incorporate attitudes toward risk; and the
vexing problems of measuring the value of human life, of aesthetic and
cultural benefits, and of harm to the natural world. Disputes over these
issues turn on deep philosophical questions-for example, valuing
future generations versus balancing capital and labor in the production
of goods and services; acknowledging the value of extra years of life
versus "life" itself; taking risk preferences into account; and giving cul-
ture, ecosystems, and natural objects a place in the calculus. These
issues do not have "right" answers within economics. They should not
be obscured by efforts to put them under the rubric of a CBA. Politically
responsible officials in the agencies and the White House should resolve
them in a transparent way.
Sometimes one policy is much better than many others under a
wide range of assumptions. Sensitivity tests can explore this possibility.
There is no need to resolve difficult conceptual and philosophical issues
if the preferred outcome does not depend on the choice of a discount rate
or the value given to human life. Such tests should be a routine part of
the analytic toolkit and of the options presented to the ultimate
policymakers.
I1. See, for example, my advocacy of cost-benefit analysis as a background norm for courts
to apply to the review of regulations designed to correct a market failure in SusAN RosE-
ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN
REGULATORY STATE (1992). Sunstein claims that, in a weaker and modified form, this is already
what the courts do. SUNsTEIN, supra note 9, at 31-89.
338 [Vol. 65:335
RETHINKING REGULATORY REVIEW
Second, many policies raise important issues of distributive justice,
individual rights, and fairness, especially between generations. Talk of
"net-benefit maximization" does not help illuminate these value choices.
These issues raise measurement problems, but the difficulties with CBA
run deeper. Even if everything could be measured precisely, CBA would
be an inappropriate metric. Attempts to add distributive weights to CBA
are fundamentally misguided. They suppose that technocrats, especially
economists, can resolve distributive justice questions.' 2 The distributive
consequences of policies should be part of the public debate over poli-
cies, aided by technocrats who can help to outline the distributive conse-
quences of various policies. The main analytic problem is familiar to
students of tax incidence. The nominal cost bearer may pass on some of
the costs to others. Distributive impacts are often difficult to measure
and trace.
This second category includes policy issues that have a large
impact on society, at present and over multiple generations. Choices
taken today may be irreversible or very costly to change, and they may
risk large negative consequences for future generations. In these cases,
the marginal, microanalytic framework characteristic of cost-benefit
analysis is not appropriate even if one stays within a utilitarian frame-
work. The problems-climate change, risks from the storage of nuclear
waste, loss of biodiversity, to give a few examples-may have large
pervasive impacts that stretch far into the future. Catastrophes are possi-
ble, even if not likely. These issues raise broad economic and social
issues that require a different normative framework.
I review the limitations of CBA as a policy criterion and use my
critique as a ground for proposing a revised executive order to the
Obama Administration. The new executive order should continue to
require both up-front consultation on the regulatory agenda and ongoing
review of major regulations above some minimum level of importance.
As Revesz and Livermore recommend, OIRA could play a larger role in
overall agenda setting and policy coordination across agencies." Such
review serves the interest of any president seeking to influence the over-
all regulatory environment. Hence, both consultation and review should
be mandatory for core executive agencies, but, under my proposed
12. For a recent attempt to revive the concept of a social-welfare function (SWF) weighted
toward those with low levels of utility, see Matthew D. Adler, Future Generations: A Prioritarian
View, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1478 (2009) [hereinafter Adler, Future Generations]; see also
Matthew D. Adler, Risk Equity: A New Proposal, 32 HARv. ENvT. L. REv. 1 (2008) [hereinafter
Adler, Risk Equity]. Adler, however, does not explain how a SWF ought to be constructed except
that it should be strictly increasing and concave in utilities, and he argues that the resulting SWF,
however derived, ought to be only an input into the process of policy choice.
13. See REVESZ & Liv-ERMoRE, supra note 9, at 171-83.
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framework, the executive order would only require agencies to carry out
formal CBAs for a subset of regulations.
To avoid conflicts with the political pressures facing the President,
an advisory body independent of the White House should provide expert
analytic advice to agency policy analysts and to OIRA. In this, I build on
Stephen Breyer, who urges the creation of a separate expert agency with
the mission of rationalizing regulatory policy across programs that regu-
late risk.14 Bruce Ackerman also recommends the creation of an integ-
rity branch, concerned with transparency and limiting corruption, and a
regulatory branch insulated from day-to-day political influences but
required to justify its actions publicly." Either OIRA, or this new advi-
sory body, should create a library of innovative tools for achieving regu-
latory goals that go beyond the much criticized command-and-control
model. Agency policymakers could access this library as they look for
innovative ways to achieve goals, as could those contemplating amend-
ments to existing laws.
OIRA is a mixture of expertise and politics. As such, it is an impor-
tant part of any president's efforts to control the executive branch."6
However, it is not a neutral arbitrator. A reformed OIRA can serve an
important function, but a more independent source of analytic knowl-
edge could provide a useful check.
I begin with situations where cost-benefit criteria seem
unproblematic-at least to those with some training in public-finance
economics-that is, government efforts to correct market failures caused
by such factors as externalities or monopoly power. Next, I expand my
compass to include programs with other goals besides economic effi-
ciency where the regulatory agency may seek cost-efficient solutions but
cannot reduce a program's goals to an exercise in net-benefit maximiza-
tion. Finally, based on these critiques I conclude with proposals for the
restrained use of cost-benefit criteria and policy analytic techniques that
acknowledge both the President's interest in managing the regulatory
process and the need for some check on the analytic practices of a
diverse set of regulatory agencies.
14. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECrIVE RISK
REGULATION 55-81 (1993).
15. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 688-714
(2000).
16. See Graham, supra note 4, at 465-80 (defending the role of OIRA during his tenure as
OIRA head during the George W. Bush Administration). But see Lisa Schultz Bressman &
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REv. 47 (2006) (discussing the relatively limited role of OIRA
even within the White House).
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CASE 1: CORRECTING MARKET FAILURES
Markets are not always efficient. So much is the conventional wis-
dom in economics. Externalities, such as air and water pollution, impose
costs that a profit-maximizing firm will not take into account unless reg-
ulatory laws or the threat of legal liability induce it to do so. Firms may
seek to exercise monopoly power, and high entry barriers can make
competition unlikely. Information about risks and harms may be
unavailable or poorly processed by busy people who lack expertise. One
can plausibly view regulatory laws that seek to correct such market fail-
ures through the lens of economic efficiency. They aim to correct
problems in particular markets and sectors and are not appropriate loci
for broad distributive justice concerns that implicate the overall distribu-
tion of income, wealth, and economic opportunity. True, some policies
may have a particularly severe impact on a narrowly focused group, but
such problems can be dealt with as a side constraint.
For such policies, the goal of finding the most economically effi-
cient solution seems relatively unproblematic. The problem is one of
measurement, not principle. Yet, even here issues of principle arise in
seeking appropriate measuring rods. At the most basic level, the goal is
to maximize the net benefits from a policy, but how should one measure
benefits and costs so that they are calculated in units that permit compar-
ison? Jeremy Bentham, the ultimate source of the cost-benefit test,
thought that individual utility could be measured in cardinal, interper-
sonal units and added up to get "the greatest happiness of the greatest
number."" Suppose that marginal benefits fall as the scale of the policy
increases and that marginal costs rise. Then welfare is at a maximum
where the marginal benefits of the policy equal the marginal costs. Leav-
ing aside debates over the implications of his principle for population
policy, the key problem with Bentham's formulation is that no one
knows how to measure utility so as to permit cardinal, interpersonal
comparisons. Utility is not an essence that can be measured in units like
inches and pounds and compared across people.18 Fortunately, the
Marginalist Revolution in economics at the end of the nineteenth century
demonstrated that one could obtain the key results in economic theory
by doing away with cardinal, interpersonally comparable utility and
assuming only that people could order the options available to them in a
17. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 5
n.1 (photo. reprint 1907) (1823).
18. Van Neumann and Morgenstern developed a way to produce a cardinal utility scale for
individuals based on their revealed preferences over lotteries, but it does not permit interpersonal
comparisons. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
EcONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953). For criticisms of this approach, see KEN BINMORE, RATIONAL
DECISIONs 58-59 (2009).
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consistent way. Eventually, revealed-preference theory showed how
consistent preference relations could be derived from the study of the
actual choices that individuals make in the market." However, that
revolution, elegant and important as it was, essentially did away with the
normative analysis of policy in utilitarian terms. How could one tell if
one policy was better than another if one could not compare the benefits
and costs obtained by different people on a single metric? Pareto effi-
ciency seemed to be all that was left-that is, a collection of possible
outcomes where no one can be made better off without someone else
being made worse off. All societies have many such points where no
resources are being wasted but that differ in the way resources are allo-
cated across individuals. One can identify market failures that put soci-
ety below the efficiency frontier, but that leaves open a range of possible
ways to move to an efficient outcome that might impose costs on some
and benefits on others.
Many Pareto optimal results are not Pareto superior to the status
quo; in other words, they are efficient, but getting there imposes costs on
some and benefits on others. However, limiting policy only to Pareto
superior options places a huge normative weight on the status quo distri-
bution of resources. One would have to argue that the status quo is so
fair and just that no one should be made worse off in order to provide
social benefits for society.
Economists filled the breach in the mid-twentieth century by posit-
ing a "social-welfare function" to represent the way society somehow
had decided to trade off the welfare of its citizens. Policymakers should
maximize this function subject to the Pareto efficiency frontier to pro-
duce the best possible choice given limited resources-an outcome
called, oddly, "the bliss point" by some economic analysts.20 Kenneth
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem demonstrated that such a function did
not exist under minimal conditions, something that political scientists
and practical politicians with experience of the clash of private interests
may not have found surprising.2 1 The economics profession seemed to
be back to the mere claim that government policy could be used to cor-
rect market failures, but with little to say about which option was best.2 2
Cost-benefit analysis entered to fill the gap-first, for dam building
by the Army Corps of Engineers and then for a broader range of poli-
19. See PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 90-124 (1948).
20. See id. at 219-28; Abram Bergson, A Reformation of Certain Aspects of Welfare
Economics, 52 Q.J. ECON. 310 (1938).
21. See KENNETH J. ARRow, SocIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
22. A recent attempt to revive the concept by Matthew Adler has not solved the problem of
making interpersonal comparisons in a persuasive way. See Adler, Future Generations, supra note
12; Adler, Risk Equity, supra note 12.
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cies, now including regulatory policies. 23 The basic idea was to stick to a
Benthamite utilitarian calculus but to use dollars as the common metric
instead of utilities. But there is a familiar problem with dollars. They do
not have a one-to-one relationship to utility or happiness. A wealthy
person may be willing to pay more dollars for a benefit or to avoid a cost
than a poorer person simply because he or she has more money to spend.
However, if the program is small relative to the overall size of the econ-
omy and is not particularly skewed toward or away from one or another
income group, market prices provide a reasonable proxy for the opportu-
nity cost of resources used to carry out the policy. One can think of the
policy as a marginal change toward the Pareto frontier with any serious
distributive consequences highlighted and dealt with separately.24
Suppose one has allayed those fears and is ready to carry out a
CBA that isolates the opportunity costs of a program and quantifies the
benefits. In other words, the goal is to go beyond the budgetary costs to
the government to ask if there are other social costs and to calculate the
social benefits. The first task is the unproblematic one of itemizing bene-
fits and costs measured in whatever units are available, be they dollars;
expected lives saved or lost; health effects; or benefits to nature and to
cultural or historical artifacts. These benefits and costs need to be quan-
tified on an annual basis into the future with any uncertainties noted.
These are the basic building blocks, and it is hard to criticize efforts to
amass such information, except to note that scarce time and money may
limit the quality and quantity of these data.
The easiest cases are those where a reasonably competitive market
exists so that analysts can use market prices to measure opportunity
costs on the assumption that the policy itself does not affect market
prices. For example, when the Army Corps of Engineers considers
whether to build a dam, it can use the market prices of cement, sand, and
labor to estimate costs. Farmers benefit from cheaper irrigation water.
This can translate into higher yields with the benefits measured by the
increased sales of farm products, assuming the project has no impact on
the overall market. The Corps can discount the stream of benefits back
to the present using a discount rate that reflects the opportunity cost of
capital. One can criticize the narrow focus on farm productivity and tan-
23. On the early history of CBA in the federal government, see generally PUBLIC
EXPENOTURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS (Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis eds., 1970)
(assessing the state of policy analysis as a technique and as used within the federal government
under the so-called, planning programming budgeting system). For an early collection of cost-
benefit studies, see MEASURING BENEFrrS OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS (Robert Dorfman ed.,
1965). The first mention of cost-benefit balancing was in the 1936 Flood Control Act (P. L. 74-
738) that required that "the benefits to whomever they accrue exceed the costs."
24. See MISHAN & QUAH, supra note 2; WEIMER & VINING, supra note 2.
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gible costs, but given this view of the relevant costs and benefits, the
Corps can rely on the larger market system to determine the opportunity
costs and the benefits of the project.
Note how easily measurement problems arise in regulatory areas
that do not track the simple case outlined above. Market prices are not
available for many regulatory benefits and costs, and clever attempts to
mimic the market are fraught with uncertainty. One possible discount
rate is the opportunity cost of capital, but others argue for the con-
sumers' rate of time preference-rates that, in our imperfect world, need
not be equivalent. Using the opportunity cost of capital assures a capital-
labor ratio for government programs in line with private investment
incentives so that capital is not over- or underused by the government. A
familiar problem in the Soviet Union was the overly capital-intensive
nature of investment projects because capital, in Marxist theory, had no
value and hence was overused. Using the rate of time preference
requires one to know how citizens trade off present and future benefits
and costs. If capital markets have imperfections, these rates need not be
equal. 25
If the benefits of correcting a market failure extend far into the
future, the policy must incorporate the preferences of future generations.
The logic of discounting means that these preferences are given little
weight beyond fifty or so years at any discount rate close to the long-run
rate of return on capital. For most conventional regulatory and spending
programs this does not raise any particular problems. The policies cor-
rect market failures that will benefit people in the relatively short run,
and most importantly, there are no irreversibilities. The effects do not
threaten future generations with catastrophe or the possibility of bad
macroeconomic outcomes. In general, one can presume that policies that
make the economy more efficient and less subject to negative externali-
ties will, on balance, be policies that future generations will want to
continue. However, future generations can decide, on their own, whether
or not to pursue the policy. One still needs to set a discount rate or, at
least, to perform a sensitivity analysis using a range of plausible rates,
but the problem arises from market imperfections, not deep philosophi-
25. For different perspectives articulated in articles collected in a University of Chicago Law
Review symposium on intergenerational equity and discounting, see Geoffrey Heal, Discounting:
A Review of Basic Economics, 74 U. CI. L. REv. 59 (2007); Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars,
Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. CI. L. REv. 79
(2007); Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CI. L. REv. 119 (2007); Dexter
Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 145
(2007); Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and
Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. Cm. L. REv. 171 (2007); W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting
for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. Cm. L. REv. 209 (2007).
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cal controversies. A key condition is that the policy is reversible in the
future if the polity so decides. Present-day policymakers are not locking
in future governments and are not subjecting future generations to irre-
versible catastrophic risks.
A second measurement issue is the treatment of risk. Many poli-
cies, especially in the area of health and safety, have uncertain benefits.
They reduce the risk of cancer or lung disease, say, but there is a large
margin of error in the estimates. Furthermore, even if the actual number
of cases is known with a high level of certainty, no one may know ex
ante who will actually get sick. These two kinds of risk raise different,
but linked, issues of measurement.
The easiest case is one where the risk is distributed broadly and
equally across the population, and the regulation reduces everyone's risk
by an equal amount. Then the expected benefit would be the fall in risk
multiplied by the average level of harm. If the harm is measurable, the
only problem here is the possibility that people have different attitudes
toward risk. Should one use expected values, which assume risk neutral-
ity, or assume that people are generally risk averse? This is an issue
either of predicting preferences or of arguing that government policy
ought to adopt a particular attitude toward risk independent of the
expected views of citizens.
More difficult cases arise when the science does not provide good
estimates of the risk avoided by the policy. Then the risk is not limited
to the identity of the victims but includes uncertainty about the actual
level of harm avoided. 26 How precautionary should the regulation be
when there is some chance that the harm avoided may be quite small?
Should this depend upon estimates of risk aversion or, alternatively, on
potential victims' fear of being harmed?
Paradoxically, a policy may be harder to put in place if the state
knows the identities of the victims, some of whom can be saved depend-
ing upon the stringency of the policy. Here, most receive no benefits,
and a few receive very large benefits in extra years of life or enhanced
quality of life. There is no reason to think that people value life and
health in a linear fashion. Perhaps you will pay a small amount to
improve the safety of your automobile so that the risk of a fatal car crash
is reduced from, say, two percent to one percent, but one cannot multi-
26. See, for example, the debate over the Environmental Protection Agency's regulation of
arsenic in drinking water. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 91-98, 111-14; Jason
K. Burnett & Robert W. Hahn, A Costly Benefit: Economic Analysis Does Not Support EPA's
New Arsenic Rule, REG., Fall 2001, at 44; Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J.
2311 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEo. L.J. 2255 (2002); Richard
Wilson, Underestimating Arsenic's Risk: The Ltest Science Supports Tighter Standards, REG.,
Fall 2001, at 50.
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ply that number by 100 to determine the amount you must be paid to be
killed for sure. Presumably, the curves relating willingness to pay and
probability of death or serious injury are not linear. This poses the famil-
iar conundrum in public policymaking where society spends large
amounts to rescue particular individuals trapped in coal mines or under
earthquake rubble but does not spend much up front to prevent such
accidents in the first place.
Finally, beyond attempts to measure the value of life and morbid-
ity, the market does not price other benefits and costs. These include the
value of natural objects, and of historical and cultural monuments and
practices. Travel-time studies can proxy recreation benefits so long as
there is some parallelism between more distant sites and newly available
ones closer to population centers. Property-value gradients can approxi-
mate the value of clean air. Surveys help place a value on saving wild-
life. All of these methods have weaknesses, but, at least, they recognize
that such benefits are not zero.27 However, they often represent efforts to
shoehorn impressionistic, subjective benefits into objective categories so
that one is not sure what has been gained as a result of the Herculean
assumptions needed to represent the benefits in dollar terms. Jonathan
Wiener makes a distinction between "cold" and "warm" analysis. The
former only includes benefits and costs that can be quantified in
unproblematic dollar terms. The latter attempts to include the kind of
benefits and cost outlined here. Wiener rejects "cold" CBA, but that
seems an easy choice. 2 8 Even to the most committed cost-benefit propo-
nent, "cold" analysis is simply incompetent analysis that does not satisfy
the requirements of the technique. The only important conceptual issue
raised by these difficult-to-measure factors is not the lack of good-dollar
estimates, but the question of whether one should include any benefits
and costs outside of those experienced by humans.
Thus, even when one can justify CBA as a normative matter, cost-
benefit analysis faces at least four challenges. These are the problematic
link between dollar totals and overall utility or net benefits; the choice of
a discount rate; the treatment of risk and uncertainty; and the quantifica-
tion of life, health, and other nonmarket values in the metric of dollars.
Economic experts can highlight the wrong way to deal with these diffi-
cult problems, but they cannot ultimately solve these problems within
27. For examples, see MARION CLAWSON & JACK L. KNETsci, EcONOMICS OF OUTDOOR
RECREATION (1966) (discussing travel costs); Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent
Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP., Autumn 1994, at 45
(discussing contingent valuation); V. Kerry Smith & Ju-Chin Huang, Can Markets Value Air
Quality? A Meta-Analysis of Hedonic Property Value Models, 103 J. POL. EcON. 209 (1995)
(discussing property values).
28. See Wiener, supra note 8, at 483-89.
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the paradigm of welfare economics. Nevertheless, if analysts admit to
these difficulties and carry out sensitivity analyses to see if the choice of
discount rate or the use of proxies for nonmarket values matters to the
outcome, a cost-benefit framework can help structure the policy debate.
It can highlight the areas where judgments from outside welfare eco-
nomics need to be brought in to make the final decision.
CASE 2: OTHER VALUES IN REGULATORY POLICY
Many regulations are meant to take account of values over and
above economic efficiency. They guide transfer programs, such as
Social Security, disability, or welfare. They are part of the administra-
tion of subsidy programs, such as those under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (USDA). They are concerned with the fair-
ness and equity of markets, such as the regulations of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and some rules issued by the
Department of Labor and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
They take on moral issues, as in the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's (FCC) regulation of speech in the media. 29 A pure cost-benefit
test, with its omission of distributive, fairness, and procedural concerns,
would not encompass the purposes of these statutory mandates. Pure
transfers from taxpayers to beneficiaries cancel out in a CBA. However,
economic analysis can help locate cost-efficient options and can
encourage agencies to find ways to give incentives to regulated firms to
take these other values into account. It can complement traditional pub-
lic administration reforms by introducing economic incentives into
bureaucratic performance. But for such programs, CBA cannot be the
criterion for the choice of a regulatory policy or the scale of a policy
already mandated by statute.
One can frame the issue in terms of benefits and costs that should
or should not enter the policy calculation. A strong utilitarian in the
Benthamite tradition would not omit any gains or losses, including those
experienced by other sentient beings that feel pain. However, just as
some want to include a wide range of weakly quantified benefits and
costs, others argue for the exclusion of benefits and costs experienced by
people as a result of their violent behavior or fraudulent activities. One
possible guide is the criminal law. One can argue that if the state
designates an action as a crime, then the gains to the perpetrator should
29. See, for example, the recent controversy over the FCC's regulation over "fleeting
expletives" which has already gone once to the U.S. Supreme Court on administrative law
grounds and may return under a constitutional free-speech challenge. See FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009), rev'g 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007). On remand, the Second
Circuit granted Fox's petition for review of the FCC's order. Fox Television Stations, Inc., v.
FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2010).
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not count in the social calculation. 0 In a similar vein, Matthew Adler
and Eric Posner, in their effort to give CBA a new and distinctive
grounding, argue for "laundering preferences" so only idealized ones
count in the cost-benefit calculus.' They emphasize cognitive errors and
biases in individual choices. However, an alternative based on actual
political choices would use the criminal law as a measure of society's
willingness to include certain benefits in the welfare calculus.
OIRA review does not extend to independent agencies, such as the
EEOC and FCC. However, it does cover the USDA and Health and
Human Services (HHS), which administer many social-benefit pro-
grams. During the Clinton Administration, HHS and USDA were second
and third after the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the num-
ber of economically significant rules reviewed by OIRA.32 Many of their
rules govern the operation of government subsidy programs. For these
rules noneconomic values will often be primary. Executive Order 12,866
does permit OIRA and the agencies that prepare the analyses to consider
a broad range of values, but just how they should do this is left vague.
Hence, OIRA review may at times be over-inclusive, applying cost-ben-
efit criteria to policy choices where they do not fit with the underlying
purposes of the regulatory policy. A better response would be to require
cost-effectiveness analysis in such cases and to help agencies design
innovative programs that build on individual incentives to further pro-
gram goals.
CASE 3: LARGE-SCALE MULTI-GENERATION PROBLEMS:
IRREVERSIBILITIES AND CATASTROPHES
Welfare economists often study long-run macroeconomic policies
where nothing is held constant. The normative framework has tradition-
ally aimed to maximize the sustainable rate of economic growth, a pol-
icy position that obviously calls for the present generation to give up
consumption in the interest of long-run economic growth.3 4 Others have
30. Consistent application of this criterion, of course, might lead one to advocate
decriminalization of some offenses.
31. See ADLER & POSNER supra note 9, at 36-38, 124-53.
32. Under Clinton, the EPA issued 149 economically significant rules, HHS issued 121, and
the USDA issued 118. Croley, supra note 4, at 865.
33. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2006).
34. See, e.g., Edmund Phelps, The Golden Rule of Accumulation: A Fable for Growthmen, 51
Am. EcON. R. 638 (1961); see also Heal, supra note 25, at 67 (distinguishing, as I do, between
small projects and those with economy-wide implications). For small projects, the consumers' rate
of time preference or the return on capital is appropriate, as argued above. For projects with
economy-wide implications, Heal argues that the pure rate of time preference should be used to
discount utility, a rate that does not depend on the historical return to capital. His analysis draws
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pointed out that there is no sound philosophical reason to favor the
future over the present so that the goal should be to maximize the
steady-state level of per capita income over time." These models
assumed an infinitely lived civilization that could save and invest at dif-
ferent rates over time. If we add in the possibility that the present can
impose large, irreversible, and possibly catastrophic costs on the distant
future, this raises the question of intergenerational obligation with par-
ticular salience.
To see the problem, consider the issue of climate change. Society
will experience many of the benefits of climate change policy far in the
future. Using even a low-end discount rate, say five percent, implies that
a one dollar benefit obtained fifty years in the future has a present value
of nine cents. At three percent, the present value is twenty-three cents
and at six percent it is five cents. Suppose to keep things simple that all
the benefits will accrue in year fifty and that they will be five billion
dollars. At five percent, the discounted present value of these benefits is
$450,000, but it could be much higher or lower depending upon the
discount rate chosen. Should that choice determine the global policy on
climate change?
Even those who advocate the equal worth of all generations accept
a long-run positive growth rate as a fact of human history, in spite of the
doubt cast on this claim as a result of climate change or other systemic
risks. In other words, they assume that the market will generate a posi-
tive interest rate. That assumption produces much of the agonizing over
the social rate of discount. Some claim that the lives of those in future
generations should count equally to present lives and that that implies a
zero discount rate for saved lives or sacrifices under some policy. With
a positive rate of return on capital, however, such a philosophical com-
mitment to equity would imply that, under a cost-benefit test, it will
always be optimal to accept present risks to life that will reduce compa-
rable future risks by a small amount.3 7
If instead one considers the welfare of future generations, and not
just the number of people alive, then one can avoid this extreme result.
on research on economic growth and assumes a utilitarian social-welfare function-not an
obvious choice outside of economics. He does not explicitly consider irreversibilities, such as
those that may arise with global warming. Both Heal and Kysar argue that for long-term policies,
the discount rate is not exogenous but is a function of policy choices. See Kysar, supra note 25, at
128. Once again the distinction between partial and general equilibrium analysis is important. But
see Viscusi, supra note 25 (arguing that no distinction should be made).
35. See, e.g., Samida & Weisbach, supra note 25.
36. See e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 941(1999).
37. John Graham provides an example of the absurdities that can result. See Graham, supra
note 4, at 442-47.
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As Samida and Weisbach point out, treating all generations as equally
worthy is not the same thing as putting aside the same amount of money
in the present for all generations.3 ' The present generation must only put
aside enough so that compound interest will produce an amount equal to
what it has kept for itself. It is one thing to value all generations equally
in the social-welfare calculation and quite another to use a discount rate
of zero when evaluating the value of saved lives and morbidity. The
former assumes a policy goal and asks the state to achieve it by means of
choices that take account of the opportunity cost of capital to investors.
The latter takes the choice of a discount rate to reflect the social values
of benefits and costs occurring at different points in time. If we assume a
civilization of infinite (or at least several centuries) duration, with no
irreversible links between catastrophe risks and today's policies, then the
interests of the future are reflected in the discount rates that exist at
present. However, two problems remain: converting wellbeing to a met-
ric that can be measured and compared and dealing with the possibility
of catastrophic, irreversible downside risks.
As to the former, Louis Kaplow has tried to get around this prob-
lem by assuming that utility at any point in time can be converted to
dollars, discounted back to the present at the opportunity cost of capital,
and then compared with a similarly monetized value for present lives.39
That technique is consistent with the Samida and Weisbach approach,
but it downplays the problem of making the required conversion. There
would be no difficulty if we could assume that different generations are
essentially similar on average, that we only care about the average, and
that the distortions introduced to the welfare measure by using a mone-
tary proxy are not so severe as to seriously skew the ranking of options.
Furthermore, there must not be important irreversibilities that threaten
overall wellbeing in a way that cannot be balanced by other compensat-
ing measures. Unfortunately, even if the other assumptions hold, the
issue of climate change and other large-scale risks do not satisfy the
irreversibility condition. For such issues, one should not waste time wor-
rying about problems that arise in ordinary policy analytic exercises.
If catastrophic and irreversible harms are possible, then conven-
tional cost-benefit analysis is not an appropriate tool. If our present
actions increase the chances of a global disaster, this behavior will show
up in the long-run rate of interest. The rate on long-run investments
ought to rise to reflect that risk so that the certainty equivalents of differ-
ent investments are kept in line. The supply of funds for projects that
will only pay off in the distant future ought to shrink. Those shifts might
38. See Samida & Weisbach, supra note 25, at 145.
39. See Kaplow, supra note 25, at 79.
350 [Vol. 65:335
RETHINKING REGULATORY REVIEW
be sufficient to persuade the government to initiate policies to limit
those risks, but note that, because of the logic of discounting, very long-
run harms will have little impact on current markets. The debate ought
not to be framed as a debate over the discount rate.' Rather, it concerns
the obligations of the present towards the future. Some economic ana-
lysts have dismissed this concern with the claim that future generations
will be richer than we are and so we need not worry about them, beyond
the incentives for saving and investment given by market interest rates
and inter-familiar affection. Today, the ground has shifted as climate
change and other risks appear to threaten future generations' hold on
prosperity. We can still use economics to discuss the cost-effective ways
to deal with climate change, but it is not going to resolve the basic issue.
In short, we should discount all future benefits and costs for
focused regulatory and spending programs that correct market failures in
the near to medium term. We should be transparent about modeling and
measurement choices that require us to bring in noneconomic judgments
and use a sensitivity analysis to see if decisions involving these variables
matter to the final outcome. We should not, however, force cost-benefit
analysis to perform tasks for which it is, in principle, not suited. Those
include policies which serve other goals, such as fairness or poverty alle-
viation, and those that have macroeconomic consequences that are large,
multigenerational, and potentially irreversible. In such cases, economic
analysts can help to frame cost-effectiveness studies and to assure that
policymakers include all the opportunity costs and secondary benefits.
However, the ultimate policy choices must be made on other grounds.
These distinctions suggest a reconstituted role for OIRA and for eco-
nomic analysis in general to which I now turn.
OIRA AND ORPAT: PUTTING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ITS PLACE
OIRA should have two tasks: a broad coordinating and agenda-set-
ting role, and a role for reviewing regulations that seek to correct market
failures in the short to medium run. Congress might then create an office
charged with developing generic improvements in cost-benefit analysis
and related techniques and in carefully separating difficult issues that
can be enlightened by better economic analysis and those that require
the consideration of other values. Because there may be a mismatch
between statutory purposes and economic justifications for regulation,
40. As it is in many of the contributions to the University of Chicago Law Review symposium
on intergenerational equity and discounting. See, e.g., Sunstein & Rowell, supra note 25, at 171;
Viscusi, supra note 25, at 209.
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one role for this new office could be to propose amendments to existing
statutes that would do a better job of sorting out market failures from
other goals and that would tailor regulatory techniques to statutory
purposes.
The existing executive order asks the agency to identify the market
failure that justifies the regulation.4 ' The wording, however, suggests
that market failures are the only justifications for regulations-an obvi-
ous falsehood-and also that if a market failure exists, then cost-benefit
analysis is the proper approach to policymaking-also a mistake.
Rather, the wording should be changed to say that if a market failure
justifies regulation, if the program has over $100 million per year in
impact on the economy, if the regulated entities are "small" relative to
the economy as a whole, and if most benefits and/or costs will be felt
within fifty years or if the policy is reversible, then OIRA should require
the agency to document the benefits and costs. These should be mone-
tized whenever feasible using opportunity-cost principles and discounted
to the present at the riskless rate of return on capital gross of taxes. If
this rate is demonstrated to differ from consumers' rate of time prefer-
ence, an alternative calculation should document that divergence. Poli-
cies that save or take life-years, and/or involve injuries and illnesses
should be monetized on the basis of data suggesting willingness to pay
for or willingness to accept risks in the job market and in the product
market, taking into account the usual caveats. Once again, controversies
over the estimates used should be acknowledged and dealt with through
a sensitivity analysis. Of course, other problems of valuation exist,
including attitudes toward risk, and the valuation of nature and of histor-
ical and cultural objects. These add additional complications that will
sometimes mean that a cost-benefit analysis is not worthwhile. Even if
one can identify a market failure, for example, in the production of cul-
ture, a formal cost-benefit analysis might include so many imponder-
ables that it is useless as a policy tool. The same may be true of
regulations seeking to prevent terrorism or improve national security. A
cost-benefit analysis will only be a salient tool in the policy process if
most decision-makers accept its validity as a guide to choice and if mea-
surement problems do not undermine its ability to narrow the policy
space.
If the above conditions do not hold, OIRA should not require a
CBA of an agency. For rules with short- and medium-term effects, it
should ask for a cost-effectiveness analysis that shows how the goals of
the program can be attained at the same time as the regulatory burden is
41. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993), reprinted as amended in
5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
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kept in check. This exercise may involve a set of options that show how
the policy goal can be met at higher or lower costs to the economy.
Broad systemic policies, such as climate change, should be outside
the programmatic framework of CBA or cost-effectiveness studies.
These policies need to involve the Council of Economic Advisors and
other agencies, such as the Federal Reserve System and the Department
of the Treasury, which focus on macroeconomic policy. However, their
involvement is not sufficient. To the extent that these agencies consider
the long run, they generally concentrate on measureable economic
growth. The economy-wide and even global scale of their concerns is
the correct one for the issue of climate change, but their focus is too
narrow. Furthermore, conventional intergenerational analysis is limited
if there is the added possibility of an irreversible catastrophe, rather than
the more familiar financial panics, housing bubbles, and stock market
crashes, which eventually bottom out and reverse.
Although the President needs to draw on the expertise of policy
analysts in setting and overseeing regulatory agenda, technical and
methodological issues could be better resolved outside the political hot-
house of the White House. Even if the staff and the director of OIRA are
devoted to high-quality analysis,42 they are still in the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget and are inevitably part of the President's attempts to
set policy priorities within the Executive Branch. That seems, on bal-
ance, a desirable role for OIRA. It means that the lessons of public-
policy analysis are on the table, even if they are not always accepted.
However, if OIRA not only tries to shape the substantive policy agenda
but also seeks to determine best practices for objective analysis, it may
face a conflict of interest. It will face pressures to tailor its recommenda-
tions to the President's agenda. For individual regulations that is to be
expected, but for generic issues, such as best practice for cost-benefit
analysis, responsibility should rest in a group that is independent of the
White House and Congress. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) could play that role even though it reports to Congress. The
Comptroller General, who heads the agency, is appointed to a long term
with removal only for cause.43 True, the GAO does respond to congres-
sional requests for studies, but it can also take action on its own, and it
has become a respected source of policy analytic work. The GAO could
be given a statutory mandate to create an Office for the Review of Pol-
icy Analytic Techniques (ORPAT) and to appoint an outside board of
academic advisors to help it perform its mission. Alternatively, ORPAT
42. See Graham, supra note 4, at 465-80 (defending the role of OIRA during his tenure as
OIRA head during the George W. Bush administration).
43. See 31 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
3532011]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
might be placed within the National Science Foundation or the National
Academy of Sciences. The goal would be to separate the development of
better background information and better techniques of CBA from the
fundamental policy choice of whether a CBA is an appropriate decision
criterion in a particular case."
CONCLUSION
The controversy over the use of cost-benefit analysis to make and
assess regulatory policy has generated heated debate. Disputants accuse
each of other being illogical, elitist, unethical, or lacking in compassion.
The political difficulties of making policy in areas that involve morbid-
ity and mortality are either used to justify the rejection of economic
analysis or to argue for reliance on impartial expertise instead of mere
political rhetoric. CBA is undermined by claims that it is biased in favor
of the wealthy and of business. Alternatively, some urge that it can
counter the impact of narrow interests by incorporating a comprehensive
list of costs and benefits.
These debates often obscure the normative underpinning for cost-
benefit analysis-a technique for "project" choice in the public sector
that seeks to analogize those choices to the ones made by business firms
picking profitable projects. The difference is that, instead of profits, the
criterion of choice is overall net social benefit, but the principle is the
same. Measurement issues arise in applying the net-benefit criterion, but
such concerns do not challenge the basic appropriateness of CBA as a
normative principle. However, if the social choice cannot be character-
ized as a "project" or as a policy whose implications are small relative to
the society as a whole, then CBA is not an appropriate tool. System-
wide costs and benefits that accumulate over time can change the funda-
mental character of society; prices and other background conditions can-
not be taken as given. Then policy analysis treads on the turf of
economic-growth analysis and of political philosophy. It must confront
the future of a society over a long time frame. The debate over climate
change policy and its intersection with analyses of economic growth has
highlighted the necessity of taking this perspective. Because climate
change could produce catastrophic irreversibilities where the gainers
from inaction in the present cannot compensate the losers in the future,
ordinary attempts to incorporate the future through interest rates and dis-
44. For similar proposals with respect to environmental science, see Angus Macbeth & Gary
Marchant, Improving the Government's Environmental Science, 17 N.Y.U. ENvrn. L.J. 134,
162-68 (2008). Macbeth and Marchant propose an Institute for Scientific Assessments that would
be an independent, stand-alone agency to "gather, evaluate, and assess the existing data" for use
by regulatory agencies. Id. at 162.
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counting do not capture the essence of the problem. The logic of dis-
counting, where a small investment today grows by compound interest
to a massive sum centuries hence, is irrelevant if there might be few
people in existence to enjoy the benefits. If that possibility is simply
accepted as given by the present generation, the value of investing will
eventually fall, and the present generation, seeing catastrophe looming
for its children and grandchildren, will fail to save and invest. There may
be a self-fulfilling prophecy for the kinds of society-wide risks that
could appear on the horizon in the absence of action in the relatively
near future.
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